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The aim of this work is to show how Einstein’s quantum hypothesis leads immediately and nec-
essarily to a departure from classical mechanics. First we note that the classical description and
predictions are in terms of idealized measurements that are exact, instantaneous, non-perturbative,
independent of each other and process agnostic. If we assume we cannot arbitrarily reduce the
strength of a signal, measurements are ultimately perturbative to some degree. We show how
a physical description in which the best measurement conceivable, i.e. the ideal measurement,
perturbs the system leads to all the concepts present in quantum mechanics including conjugate
variables, probabilistic predictions and measurements connected to symmetries.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is unfortunate that, after more than half a century
that quantum mechanics has been a core part of our sci-
entific understanding, it is still surrounded by a cloud
of mystery and perceived as strange and nonintuitive.
It is true that it does predict behavior that is odd and
counter to our intuition, but does that have to imply we
are bound to feel like something escapes us?
Quantum mechanics is not the only 20th century the-
ory that has strange consequences: the concept of space-
time, time dilation, length contraction, equivalence of
mass and energy, curved space and black holes are some
of the landmarks of special and general relativity, yet
both are usually presented as natural, in fact necessary.
We believe that the main difference is that they are pre-
sented as coming from a simple physical idea, the in-
variance of the speed of light in the first case and the
equivalence principle in the second, which help us make
sense of all the other physical consequences.
Quantum mechanics, with its uncertainty principle, in-
terference and probabilistic predictions, is usually pre-
sented as a set of mathematical postulates[1], usually
prefaced by a historical perspective[2] or by a heuris-
tic account that gives some sort of justification for
them[3, 4, 5, 6]. We are not told why a Hilbert space
must be used as the phase space, or why observables are
associated with operators: that is the starting point. The
mathematical results derived from the postulates need to
be subsequently interpreted physically, with nothing else
to connect them together but the mathematical frame-
work. Should the physics not come first? Should the
math not be derived from the physics?
We are left to wonder whether we are missing some-
thing: what is the ”big physical idea” that requires us
to abandon the classical description? Maybe if we were
to present quantum mechanics derived from it, it would
increase our sense of understanding: what is understand-
ing if not being able to identify, in the midst of all that is
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confusing and misleading, that simple truth from which
all others descend?
We are convinced that this idea is something that is al-
ready present in all quantum textbooks: Einstein’s quan-
tum hypothesis. This states that light consists of and
propagates in discrete packets of energy. The aim of this
paper is to convince the reader that this assumption, by
itself, is sufficient to require departure from the classi-
cal description. The language and the level of math used
are appropriate for an introductory class, where typically
more importance is given to thought experiments and
concepts. In fact, the arguments are designed so that
they could be used ”as is” during the first lecture of an
introductory class in quantum mechanics.
In section II we will show how the classical description
is in terms of idealized measurements that are exact, in-
stantaneous, non-perturbative, independent of each other
and process agnostic. In section III we will show such an
idealized measurement is in principle possible using the
classical electromagnetic field. In section IV we will show
how the introduction of the quantum hypothesis requires
all measurements to be perturbative and that this leads
to many of the features present in quantum mechanics.
In section V we show that the concepts we developed
fit extremely well in the mathematical framework. In
section VI we extend the arguments to show how the in-
troduction of the equivalence principle and gravitation
necessarily leads to a departure from quantum mechan-
ics, as measurements are no longer independent of each
other and cannot be regarded as exact or instantaneous.
In section VII we go through some common reactions to
these arguments, comparing to other types of works.
II. IDEAL MEASUREMENTS IN CLASSICAL
MECHANICS
Predictions and measurements are fundamental in
physics: devising experiments, performing them and
comparing their results to our predictions are in essence
the activities of a physicist. In this section we are go-
ing to review some aspects of these basic concepts in the
context of classical mechanics.
In classical mechanics we describe a system by a set
2of quantities that vary in time. For example, we write
x = x(t) for position or p = p(t) for momentum. At each
moment in time, we have a prediction for each quantity:
if we were to measure, and our description were correct,
we would obtain that value. There are a few details,
though, that we have to keep in mind.
First we note that while an actual experiment will only
measure a quantity within a certain accuracy, the pre-
diction is at least in principle exact. If we increase the
accuracy of our measurement, the result will have to be
closer to our prediction for the prediction to be correct.
The prediction is really for an idealized measurement:
one for which the uncertainty is so small that it can be
neglected. 1
Secondly, an actual experiment will measure a quan-
tity within a finite interval of time while the prediction is
given for an instant. We can imagine that we improve our
measurement so that the interval is smaller and smaller.
The prediction is again in terms of an idealized measure-
ment, one in which the time interval is so small that it
can be neglected.
The third thing that we notice is that the classical de-
scription does not require us to say what quantity we are
measuring and when: the evolution does not depend on
it. In general, an actual experiment will modify the evo-
lution of the system. We can, once again, imagine that
we improve our technique so that it affects less and less
the future evolution. The prediction is really in terms
of an idealized measurement, one in which the perturba-
tion caused by the experiment is so small that it can be
neglected.
The fourth point: if we had two or more instances
of the same experiment conducted at the same time, or
within an interval so small that it could be neglected, the
prediction would be the same. While in practice this may
be difficult to achieve, ideal measurements do not inter-
fere with each other, so our description does not depend
on how many idealized measurements are performed at
a particular time: we can have several observers or just
one and we obtain the same result.
Fifth and last point: the prediction does not depend on
which particular physical process or measurement tech-
nique we use for our measurement.
So, when we write x(t) there are quite a few assump-
tions that go with it. It assumes that, at least in prin-
ciple, we can imagine an ideal measurement that is ex-
act, instantaneous, non-destructive, independent of other
measurements (or ”inter-independent”) and process ag-
nostic. This is the best measurement we can conceive.
Our description is given by the outcomes of such idealized
1 This notion of idealized measurements is not new. For example,
J. V. Jose´, E. J. Saletan, Classical dynamics: a contemporary ap-
proach (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 6: the principles
of classical mechanics ”must be understood as statements about
idealized experiments”. We expand on this notion to identify all
the underlying assumptions.
measurements at every moment in time. Even when we
do describe a ”real” measurement, we do so by describing
the entire process in terms of these idealized quantities.
In other words: we describe the world using the best
measurement we can conceive, and from this determine
predictions for our real, less perfect, measurement.
It should be noted that if any of those conditions can-
not be satisfied conceptually, our description of position
as x = x(t) would not make much sense. Also note that
since the ideal measurement is non-perturbative, inter-
independent and process agnostic, our description does
not depend on in what way, how many times, what or
even if we measure. This is what allows us to imagine
the outcomes as properties of the system we are study-
ing: they are going to be the same no matter what we
do. But we always have to keep in the back of our mind
that even these quantities are the outcome of a process,
however idealized it may be.
III. AN IDEAL PROCESS FOR AN IDEAL
MEASUREMENT
We have seen how the classical description is in terms
of ideal measurements. In this section we identify a phys-
ical process that we could conceptually use in classical
mechanics to perform such an ideal measurement. Given
that we assume that the results do not depend on what
process we use, we can choose the process we prefer. For
reasons that will become obvious in the next section, we
will focus on an ideal position measurement through the
use of the electromagnetic field.
In the simplest case, we can think of sending an electro-
magnetic signal toward our target. The electromagnetic
signal will interact with the target, leaving it affected in
general. The signal itself will also be changed and when
it is received by the detector it will give us some infor-
mation about the target. In measuring position, we can
imagine the signal bounces off the target, changing its
momentum a bit, and by knowing the initial and final
position and angles of the electromagnetic signal, we can
infer the position of our target at the time of impact.
Can this process satisfy, under ideal conditions, the re-
quirements of an ideal measurements?
To measure the position with greater accuracy, we can
reduce the width of the electromagnetic signal and, ide-
ally, we would make the packet so small that its length
can be disregarded. We can also make the duration of the
signal as short as we desire, and ideally it will be so short
that it can be disregarded. We can make the measure-
ment non-perturbative by lowering the intensity of the
signal enough so that the effect on our target can be ne-
glected. And regarding inter-independency, we note that
the equations describing the electromagnetic field are lin-
ear: different electromagnetic signals of different ideal
experiments are not going to interact with each other.
This idealized process can conceptually be used to per-
form our idealized measurement. This does not in any
3way prove that the underlying assumptions are right, or
that we can actually make such a measurement in prac-
tice: it just shows that classical mechanics is consistent.
Also note that this example is specifically chosen to re-
mind the reader of thought experiments used for special
relativity such as the ideal clock.
IV. THE QUANTUM HYPOTHESIS AND THE
IDEAL MEASUREMENT
In this section we show how the introduction of the
quantum hypothesis no longer allows us to work under
the previous idealized conditions. Even an idealized mea-
surement must be perturbative, and we show that this
perturbation has to be such that it randomizes another
physical quantity, making the future evolution indepen-
dent of it. The classical description, then, needs to be
abandoned for one that takes into account such pertur-
bation and that can only be in terms of probabilistic
predictions.
In the previous section we discussed how we can make
the ideal measurement non-perturbative by decreasing
the intensity of the field. If we introduce the quantum
hypothesis, that the electromagnetic field consists of and
propagates in discrete packets of energy, we are no longer
able to do that arbitrarily: at some point we will reach
those units of energy and we cannot go lower than that; a
photon is a photon and we cannot divide it. If the target
is massive enough so that the effect of one photon can
be disregarded, then we can still assume that our ideal
measurement is non-perturbative. If that is not the case,
then our assumptions regarding our ideal measurement
have to change. The best measurement we can hope to
achieve will still affect the system.
Given that the classical description and predictions are
in terms of the non-pertubartive assumption, this means
that the quantum hypothesis has more profound effects
than one would at first expect. This assumption was the
one that allowed us to give a description of the evolution
without having to specify what we were measuring and,
most importantly, whether we were measuring anything
at all: if ideal measurements do not affect the system, we
can ignore them. But now even ideal measurements will
affect the system, so we will at least need to specify what
is it that we are measuring at what moment in time to
properly describe the evolution of the system. Now the
question becomes whether we can hold onto the other
ideal assumptions, and what do we need to sacrifice to
keep them.
Ideally we can imagine producing a photon that is ex-
tremely well localized both in space and in time, so we
can still assume that our ideal measurement is instan-
taneous and exact. The measurement, as we said, is
now perturbative: measuring one quantity will change
at least one other quantity. So measuring position will
need to change some other quantity. Given that ideal
measurements are process independent, if measuring po-
sition using the electromagnetic field will change momen-
tum, it will have to do so for any other process. Therefore
the link between these two quantities is something deep:
whenever we describe one we need to describe the other
and the effects caused by our idealized measurement.
We still want to assume that our ideal measurement
is inter-independent: while the evolution may depend on
when and what we measure, it shall not depend on how
many times. Let us imagine a time interval dt where we
will perform N idealized measurements. Let x(t) and
p(t) be the initial position and momentum, and x(t +
dt) and p(t + dt) be position and momentum after all
measurements. We will need x(t + dt) and p(t + dt) to
give us the same description regardless of the value of N .
It is clear what needs to happen for the position, the
quantity we are measuring: all ideal measurements will
have to give us the same precise value, a real number,
so x(t + dt) will be simply a real number. It is trickier
to consider what needs to happen to the quantity that
changes: each measurement will need to change the mo-
mentum, yet the future evolution of the system must not
depend on the number of changes. We can write:
p(t+ dt) = p(t) +
∑
N
∆p (1)
where ∆p is a stochastic variable that describes the
change. We assume all changes obey the same distribu-
tion, are independent of each other and of the measured
position. What we want to understand is the ∆p distri-
bution: does it give the same value every time? Is it a
Gaussian distribution? What is the expectation? What
is the variance? Note that for the expectation of p(t+dt)
to be independent of N we need the expectation of one
perturbation to be the same as many perturbations: this
can only happen if the expectation for ∆p is zero.
< ∆p >= N < ∆p > (2)
< ∆p >= 0 (3)
Since the change cannot be identical to zero (or the ideal
measurement would not be perturbative), the variance
needs to be non-zero. The change is then a random
change, and does not privilege any direction. This means
that both ∆p and p(t + dt) will necessarily be given
in terms of probability distributions. As N increases,
p(t+ dt) will spread out, given that
σ2p(t+dt) = σ
2
p(t) +Nσ
2
∆p. (4)
The contribution given by p(t) will get smaller, and in
the limit of large N p(t+ dt) will not depend on p(t) at
all. But if this is true for large N it has to be true for
any value of N , since p(t + dt) can not depend on N :
the value of momentum after an idealized measurement
of position does not depend on the value of momentum
previous to such measurement ! Let us now imagine we
start from a slightly different initial condition:
p′(t) = p(t) + δp. (5)
4Given that p(t + dt) is independent of p(t) is, p′(t + dt)
will not change:
p′(t+ dt) = p(t+ dt). (6)
The final distribution is symmetric under boosts: after a
measurement we will have a symmetry in the conjugate
variable, the quantity that changes. Each value of mo-
mentum is therefore equally likely: p(t + dt), as well as
∆p, will be uniform distributions from minus infinity to
infinity.
Our ideal position measurement, then, is going to
change momentum so that each value is equally likely.
The way that we can describe processes if we assume
that ideal measurements are interactions is quite differ-
ent: some of our predictions will only be in statistical
terms. But we have to realize that this is not just a prob-
lem in our description or limited to our measurements.
Not only can we not measure position and momentum
precisely at the same time: no electromagnetic process
can depend deterministically on both position and mo-
mentum or can prepare a state in which both are well
defined. If we had such a process, we could use it to
make a more precise measurement. But the ideal process
we described before represents the best measurement we
could make using the electromagnetic force, so such a
process cannot exist. As future evolution cannot depend
on the value of the momentum at the time we measured
position, no process and no measurement will be able to
distinguish between those configurations. As what can
be distinguished is radically different, we will need to
redefine our concept of physical state. This is still the
output of a set of idealized measurements, as in classical
mechanics, but the output of an idealized measurement
is radically different: for each measurement quantity we
have a symmetry.
The uncertainty that comes out of assuming ideal mea-
surements are perturbative is not a simple matter of our
inability to measure precisely (as it is in classical me-
chanics): it is an intrinsic part of the physical descrip-
tion because electromagnetic processes will depend on
that uncertainty, and in fact they do. The stability of
the atomic orbits, the tunneling effect, and all the other
quantum effects are based, one way or another, on this.
And if we assume that ideal measurements and our de-
scription do not depend on what process we use, this
reasoning extends not only to electromagnetic processes,
but to all processes. The scale of this perturbation has
to be the same for all forces: it is universal and so is the
constant h¯ that defines it.
We have reached the main point of this article: as-
suming the quantum hypothesis leads necessarily to a
physical description that is radically different form the
one of classical mechanics. One could go further: we
should note that Rovelli[7] derives the whole mathemat-
ical framework of quantum mechanics starting from the
following postulates
1. There exists a maximum amount of relevant infor-
mation that can be extracted from a system.
2. It is always possible to obtain new information
about the system.
If we define the state as the output of a set of ideal mea-
surements, we imply the first. Noting that one measure-
ment creates a symmetry in another quantity implies the
second. Given that these two postulates lead to quan-
tum mechanics, and the quantum hypothesis leads to
these two postulates, one could show that the quantum
hypothesis, by itself, not only necessarily requires a de-
parture from classical mechanics, but leads to quantum
mechanics itself. We are not going to do so, as it is out-
side the scope of this particular work, but we believe it
is worth pointing it out.
In this section we saw how the quantum hypothesis
requires us to abandon the classical description. Even
ideal measurement, the best measurement we can pos-
sibly conceive, must be perturbative: the measurement
of one quantity will change another. Such change makes
the value after the measurement independent of the value
before the measurement: future evolution cannot depend
on the previous value, which also mean that it can no
longer be measured. This independence of the initial
value means that the state has a symmetry in the quan-
tity: we can ideally change it yet future evolution is the
same. A symmetry corresponds to a uniform distribution
for the description of such quantity: if we measured it we
would need to have an equal chance to get any value. Re-
alizing how these elements are so tightly connected is the
key, in our opinion, to understanding quantum mechan-
ics: one cannot have one without the others, they are all
different sides of the same coin. This way of presenting
the subject does a better job, in our opinion, of bringing
these concepts closer in the mind of the reader than what
is found in standard textbooks.
V. A DICTIONARY
Even if our aim is not to derive quantum mechanics
we want to show that the concepts that we developed
above find their place very naturally in the mathematical
framework of quantum mechanics. We do this so as to
not leave ambiguities, but also to show how disparate
characteristics of the theory can find significance using
the few concepts we have outlined. We will do this briefly
in this section touching only the important points, as the
full treatment of each particular item would essentially
result in writing a textbook, which is not the purpose of
this work either.
The notion of the ideal measurement translates, as the
reader might expect, to the projection postulate: a mea-
surement changes the state of the system to one of the
eigenstates of the hermitian operator corresponding to
the measurement, with the probability of doing so given
by the projection of one onto the other. The eigenvalue
is the outcome of the measurement and it is a real value,
meaning that the result of the ideal measurement is ex-
act. The projection is done at a particular time t, mean-
5ing the ideal measurement is instantaneous. The state
is changed during a measurement, so it is perturbative,
but if the measurement is performed by more than one
observer the final state will be the same, as further pro-
jections would yield the same result. It also does not
depend on what process is used to measure. It satisfies
all the properties we discussed.
But it has to be understood in terms of an ideal mea-
surement: a simplification, a limit, something that, in
practice, we cannot do. What it is important is not re-
ally whether we can realize it in practice, but that each
state can be seen as the outcome of this idealized process.
In mathematical terms, this means that for any state
there exists a set of Hermitian operators that have that
state as an eigenstate. This can be easily demonstrated
to be true: let |Ψa〉 and |Ψb〉 be two normalized vectors
in a Hilbert space H, and let the first be an eigenket
of Hermitian operator A. Given that they are normal-
ized, we can always define a unitary operator U such that
|Ψb〉 = U |Ψa〉: we do so by rotating on the plane defined
by the two vectors and leaving the other directions un-
changed. If we now consider the operator B = UAU †, it
is easy to show that |Ψb〉 is an eigenket of B and that B
is Hermitian.
In this light, the concept of state in both classical me-
chanics and quantum mechanics is the same: the state is
the outcome of a set of idealized measurements that must
be specified to reproduce a system. The only thing that
changes is that ideal measurements are perturbative in
quantum mechanics. This creates the strongest possible
connection between classical and quantum mechanics: it
says how they are different and how they are the same.
The idea that one quantity is changed by measuring
another is represented by conjugate quantities, such as
position/momentum and spin/angle. The symmetry af-
ter a measurement corresponds to the unitary transfor-
mation generated by the Hermitian operator. An eigen-
state of Hermitian operator A will also be an eigenstate
of the transformation 1 + Adβ/ih¯, which means it is in-
variant under that transformation, and the distribution
for an observable B(β) that depends on parameter β will
be uniform, flat: uniform distributions and symmetries
are the same thing. With this in mind, it makes much
more sense to say that final states of a measurement are
eigenstates of the generated transformation, since this ac-
tually has physical meaning, which is once again: for
every quantity measured, or well defined, we have a sym-
metry. This also works in reverse: a state with a symme-
try will have an associated observable well defined. This
provides physical intuition for the Noether theorem: if
a Lagrangian is invariant for a given transformation, the
equations of motion preserve that symmetry and the as-
sociated observable.
Other important concepts can be understood in terms
of just the ideas presented. Briefly: the commutator
describes the change of one observable under a unitary
transformation generated by a second, with the Heisen-
berg equation of motion being a specific example; a state
with defined momentum is symmetric under translation,
the evolution does not depend on position, hence non-
locality; if the measured quantity spans two systems,
such as the sum of their momentum, the symmetry also
spans both systems, such as the sum of their position: we
cannot describe the systems independently, the systems
are entangled. This should give the reader a glimpse of
how deeply these concepts are rooted in the theory.
As we said, we cannot go through an entire curricu-
lum in this article. But we believe that we have at least
shown how not only the concepts we used in the previous
sections fit perfectly within the mathematical framework,
but many more elements acquire a very straightforward
significance if related to such ideas. This ability to ex-
plain the same number of concepts with fewer ideas can
lead to a more elegant way to present the theory.
VI. LIMITATIONS OF QUANTUM
MECHANICS
We want to stress that the assumptions underneath
ideal measurements in quantum mechanics are, well,
ideal: at some point they will break down and need to
be abandoned. To that end, we show in this section how
the equivalence principle directly requires such a depar-
ture, which implies a limit of applicability for quantum
mechanics. We do not intend this treatment to be ex-
haustive and it will be only in qualitative terms: our aim
is just to show that problems exist and not to give a
solution.
In our previous description of the ideal position mea-
surement through the electromagnetic field we said that
it is inter-independent because the laws that describe
that field are linear. This is true, but we have not con-
sidered that each photon, having a finite energy, is going
to interact with others through the gravitational force.
This means that, if we introduce the equivalence prin-
ciple, measurements affect each other and it will matter
how many observers perform the same measurement at
the same time: measurements are inter-dependent. If we
want to describe the evolution of a system, we not only
have to say what is measured at each time, but also,
for example, what is the energy used as this will some-
how affect the result of other measurements and future
evolution in general: that information will have to be
part of the state. It is also evident that the projection
postulate of quantum mechanics is not at all suitable to
describe an ideal measurement in which we consider the
effect of gravity: it describes inter-independent measure-
ments and is agnostic regarding the energy involved in
the measurement.
Given that the gravitational force is orders of mag-
nitudes smaller than the electromagnetic force, we do
have cases in which the energy is such that the gravita-
tional pull can be neglected (inter-independence), while
the effect on the system being measured cannot (pertur-
bation). This is the region where quantum mechanics
6will be valid. If we require higher energies, then we reach
its limit. When is this the case?
From quantum mechanics itself we know that to probe
shorter time scales we need to use higher energies: if the
time scale required is ”fast enough” the energy will be
”large”. Since instantaneous measurements would ideally
require an infinite amount of energy, and infinite qualifies
as large, we most likely need to abandon this assumption
as well: we will need to specify what the duration of our
idealized measurement is, which will tell us how much
energy is needed. But we also need to note that, due to
special relativity, the duration in time is connected to the
precision in space. So our exact measurement assumption
must also be abandoned.
The progression should be now evident: in classical
mechanics we consider quantities as outcomes of com-
pletely ideal measurements; in quantum mechanics we
start to consider the perturbation caused by measure-
ments; here we see that to go further we also need to
consider the strength, which also affects the precision in
time and space. In other words, we are making our ideal
measurement less and less ideal.2
It is no surprise that quantum mechanics and general
relativity are difficult to integrate. What is interesting is
that the above argument is not technical (as in whether
the equations are linear or not) but it is conceptual and
pretty straightforward. Developing these ideas further is,
naturally, not in the scope of this work, which is just to
show how the quantum hypothesis requires us to abandon
classical mechanics. What we did want to show is that
the assumptions underneath quantum mechanics are, in a
way, already known to be ”wrong”. As there is no ”right”
theory in physics, only ones that are accurate within the
constraints of their validity, this section is meant to un-
derline such constraints for quantum mechanics and to
show how thinking in terms of idealized measurement al-
lows one to do that very concisely.
VII. DISCUSSION
We feel that this work could end here. However, given
that a lot has been written on quantum mechanics and
many issues are still deemed as controversial, it may be
important to better qualify our work so that it is at least
clear what we do not expect it to be. Before one forms
a definite opinion, we will discuss common reactions to
these ideas and typical comparisons that have been made.
Some people, typically ones that only give only a su-
perficial reading, argue that this work does not provide
anything new: there is no new math developed, no new
2 Note that the invariance of the speed of light, the quantum hy-
pothesis and the equivalence principle all say something about
ideal measurements: that is why their introduction always re-
quires a new way of describing physical phenomenona.
physical concepts, no new prediction. This shows a mis-
understanding on our aim, which is to better understand
a theory that is already now established for almost a cen-
tury: it is unlikely that some important piece is missing.
It is more likely, instead, that we do have all the pieces
but we have not assembled them in a way that allows the
big picture to emerge. Introducing new math or radical
new physical concepts would be, in our opinion, either
admitting our own failure or implying the failure of the
people that came before us, and we are not holding our
breath for the latter. The overall sense of familiarity that
one may experience should be seen as an actual sign of
strength of the argument, as it lacks the implication that
everyone has to review what he knows. And despite the
familiarity, the arguments as presented are not in any
work of which we are aware.
The differences are more in shifting importance be-
tween different elements to provide a better, more co-
hesive narrative. Such changes are subtle and we cannot
expect each and every reader, having read this work once,
to jump back in disbelief at how much their understand-
ing has increased. The main reason being that the reader
already knows quantum mechanics. But if someone, as we
did, uses this set of arguments to give a half an hour in-
troduction on the subject to someone who is scientifically
literate, you will discover that he can follow the thought
experiments, he does not find the reasoning hard, is of-
ten convinced of the necessity of the arguments and of
the striking consequences (like non locality and entangle-
ment). This has not been our experience when we first
learned quantum mechanics. This work can provide a
mental scaffolding to students, who can get the big pic-
ture more quickly, and who will have a placeholder in
which to put the rest of the content. If someone has al-
ready built the structure, it is clear the scaffolding is of
less use. Some readers will still be intrigued by the sim-
plicity and the elegance of the arguments, which to us
has huge value in itself, but not everybody is bound to
because, in the end, this judgement is subjective.
Some readers will try to put this work in the context of
quantum mechanics reconstructions, which we can briefly
describe as a set of different works that aim to derive
the theory from a different set of postulates than the
standard more mathematical ones.[8] While we do be-
lieve that we could derive quantum mechanics from Ein-
stein’s quantum hypothesis, we are happy to simply note
Rovelli’s work and leave it at that: we feel that why we
have to leave classical mechanics is as important, or pos-
sibly more, than where we have to go. When in dark
nights we wonder about the mysteries of quantum me-
chanics, knowing that it is the consequence of ”no bit
commitment” does not comfort us (which may be due
to our minimal background in quantum information the-
ory). We want to know why we are forced to abandon
classical mechanics. We also note that the choice of Ein-
stein’s quantum hypothesis as the foundational idea is
not arbitrary: it makes the arguments work at multi-
ple levels. It works because it is a clear physical state-
7ment of the world around us that is firmly experimen-
tally established and is (at least now) non-controversial.
It works because many feel that historically it is what
started quantum theory in the first place. It works be-
cause it has been so much in front of our noses that it
was difficult to notice its importance. It works because it
allows to introduce quantum in a similar fashion to spe-
cial and general relativity: through ideas and thought
experiments. It works because it is what Einstein got
his Nobel prize for. It feels right. Even if we could not
derive all of quantum mechanics from it, we personally
do not feel the arguments would diminish in value. The
fact that we could derive the mathematical framework as
a whole is just the cherry on top.
Other readers will try to put this work in the context
of interpretations. We can see how providing a dictio-
nary from math to physics might make one think that
this work belongs in that category. Here there are even
more important distinctions, and we believe it instruc-
tive to compare and contrast with a couple of questions
interpretations try to answer.
The first question we address is whether the wave func-
tion represents a real physical object or not. There is no
claim in our work of what the wave function represents:
in fact, there is no mention of the wave function at all.
The state as a whole, though, is fully determined by a
set of observables and their outcomes. This is also true
during the evolution, so at each moment in time there
is a set of observables that are well defined, possibly a
different set every time. These observables are as real
as real can get: they are defined whether we measure or
not, their values are the same for all observers and their
knowledge is enough to determine the state. This is the
same as classical mechanics. What is different is that
there are other observables, the conjugate ones, which
do not determine the future evolution of the system and
therefore cannot be measured. These, one might say, are
not real at all: they are not determined a priori. The
problem here, we believe, is simply the focus on valued
measurement, and we hope the reader forgives this obvi-
ous statement: the symmetry in the conjugate variable is
as measurable as the value of the original one. The sym-
metry as a whole is as real as the valued quantities: it is
there regardless of whether we measure it or not and it
is the same for all observers. We always have a set of de-
fined quantities and a set of symmetries no matter what,
and it is obvious that the two are mutually exclusive for
the same quantity. Time evolution or the act of measure-
ment simply changes which quantity and symmetry. We
let the reader decide whether this is enough to satisfy his
thirst for realism, but it is for us.
Second question: can we have hidden variables? Most
definitely: we can simply pick any value from the quan-
tities in which we have a symmetry. There is nothing
that says we should or we should not do so. The caveat
is that, no matter what value we pick, it will never come
into play in determining the future evolution of the quan-
tities that fully determine the quantum state. If it did,
then we would have a process that we can use to measure
better than the ideal measurement, which is forbidden.
That is why these variables are, in the end, hidden.3
The third question is the so-called measurement prob-
lem, which we briefly sum up. To put it simply, we have
two ways of evolving a system: the Schroedinger equa-
tion for physical processes, which evolves the state con-
tinuously and is deterministic (given an initial state we
can determine exactly the final state), and the projec-
tion postulate for measurements, which evolves the state
discontinuously and is non-deterministic. The problem
is that each measurement should be a process, but how
can measurements be non-deterministic if all processes
are deterministic?
To address this problem let us construct this thought
experiment. We start at time t in the eigenket |p0〉 of
P , and we perform an ideal measurement of some other
quantity A. At time t+ dt we will be in an eigenket |ai〉
of A, and we will perform an ideal measurement of P
so that at time t + 2dt we will be back in an eigenket
of P . At the end will have a distribution in P , and by
studying this distribution depending on what observable
A is we can understand a couple of things. First: what
is the chance we are going back to the same eigenket?
The probability to go from |p0〉 to |ai〉 is the same as for
going from |ai〉 to |p0〉, and for the probability of going
back we need to take into account all possible paths:
Prob(p0, ai) = 〈p0|ai〉〈ai|p0〉
Probtotal =
∑
ai
Prob2(p0, ai)
If the A corresponds to P , it is clear that we return to |p0〉
with complete certainty: we never leave it. Let us con-
sider the case where A is not P , but one of its eigenstates
|aˆ〉 is infinitesimally close to |p0〉. In that case, we will
change state but we are almost certain of our final state:
determinism implies continuity and vice versa. We also
require this change to be reversible, that is if we switch
the two states, we get the same change but opposite in
sign. Mathematically the two assumptions are:
〈aˆ|p0〉 = 1− ǫ
〈p0|aˆ〉 = 1 + ǫ
Under these condition, the probability to return is 1−ǫ2:
we return to the same state with certainty as we can
disregard the second order infinitesimal term. But these
are the same conditions under which the Schroedinger
equation works: determinism, continuity and reversibil-
ity. Assuming reversible determinism implies continuous
and unitary evolution, and from these two conditions we
can actually derive the Schroedinger equation!4 So, in
3 A hidden variable may only determine the future evolution of
another hidden variable.
4 See for example Sakurai[6], pp 68-72. The derivation starts from
probability conservation and continuity requirements.
8this special case, there is no actual problem. The more
the eigenkets of A differ, though, the more the jump will
be non-deterministic and the final distribution in P will
be spread. The ”worst” case is when A corresponds to
X , and we will have a uniform distribution in P .
But here we also have a bigger problem: if the momen-
tum changes, the energy changes. Where is our system
getting the energy from (or losing it to)? The only answer
possible is: from the probe of our idealized measurement.
Now think about it: if our intermediate measurement is
X , the ideal measurement has to change the momentum
to values that are possibly very very large. This means
that the smallest amount of energy required by our ideal
measurement is potentially infinite. But in the previous
section we argued that if we require energies that are large
(and infinity still counts as large) we cannot use quantum
mechanics. Whether and how these jumps do occur we
still cannot say, but it seems clear that they cannot be
described within quantum mechanics itself. Therefore it
actually makes a lot of sense we do not have an equa-
tion describing such process of measurement: it would
be nonsensical. It would describe a process based on the
assumption that such process does not exist. This does
not make quantum mechanics consistent, it simply shows
at a conceptual level why such an inconsistency occurs.
So, it is true that this work may say something about
the problems that interpretations try to address, but it
is also true that it does not really provide answers: if
anything it tells us the reason why we do not have them.
Depending on the inclination of the reader, though, this
may be far more interesting than the answers themselves,
which is definitely the case for us.
We leave up to the reader to decide for himself what
this work is closer to; we simply suggest that he keep
these ideas in consideration. No matter what one may
conclude, our claim is simply that this is a better way to
introduce quantum mechanics.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a heuristic that can be used to con-
ceptually justify the departure from classical mechanics,
which we believe useful in the context of an undergrad-
uate or graduate course of quantum mechanics. This
material is complementary to the more standard ways
of introducing quantum mechanics, because while it says
from where we need to depart from and justifies some of
the more puzzling aspects of quantum mechanics, it does
not say where we need to end up.
The advantage of introducing the subject in this man-
ner is that it brings it closer to the way that special and
general relativity are usually introduced, using thought
experiments that stimulate intuition, which we chose on
purpose to be as similar as possible to those used for
those theories. The other side effect of this introduction
is the realization of how much is implied in classical me-
chanics: it is beneficial to remind students that the use
of exact quantities, among other things, is an idealiza-
tion. Though quantum mechanics is the theory that uses
probability, it is classical mechanics that is in fact less
precise and we believe this way of presenting reinforces
that.
We also hope that this work is of interest to those
who, like us, spent a significant amount of time reading a
great number of textbooks in their youth trying to find a
satisfying conceptual justification of quantum mechanics.
May this work provide them at least part of it.
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